



慶應義塾大学グローバルCOEプログラム

論理と感性の先端的教育研究拠点

Phenomenality as a psychological construction

日時: 2011年7月8日(金) 16:30 ~ 18:30

場所: 三田キャンパス 研究室棟 A会議室

Date and Time: Friday, 8th July, 2011; 16:30 ~ 18:30
Venue: Meeting Room A, Faculty Research Building,
Mita Campus, Keio University

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司会: 渡辺 茂 (慶應義塾大学文学部教授)

Jérôme Sackur 先生はフランス ENS で、哲学および心理実験の両面からヒトの内省や意識とその機構について研究されています。今回は哲学的視点に重点を置き、意識を「現象学的意識」と「アクセス意識」に区分した上で前者を扱う方策について、ご見解をお話いただく予定です。皆様ふるってご参加ください。

Abstract: Most extant theories of consciousness are committed to the distinction between "phenomenal" and "access" consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness refers to the subjective, experiential and qualitative aspect of our stream of thought, while access consciousness corresponds to the declarative and explicit content of our mental life --- the part that can, notably, be verbally expressed and acted upon. This distinction stems from a long and respectable tradition in philosophy; it seems highly desirable in view of our intuitions; and it has been recently vindicated by very strong theoretical arguments. However, the mapping of these two forms of consciousness on psychological or neuroscientific concepts is still a challenge, marred with experimental difficulties and methodological intricacies. This has led some to question the bare notion of phenomenal consciousness as a valid concept for scientific inquiry --- a position that put the whole project of a scientific study of consciousness in jeopardy.

In this talk, I will present some ideas that may help solving some of these issues: while fully acknowledging the importance of the phenomenal aspect of our experience, I will suggest that it may not require mechanisms, or neural substrates, that would differ substantially from those needed to account for access consciousness. Mechanisms of access when applied to mental representations of varying complexity and completeness may lead to what we experience as "phenomenality". Thus I will argue for phenomenality against phenomenal consciousness. Importantly, this challenges the notion that phenomenality is primary and more basic than access. Quite on the contrary, the phenomenal aspect of our mental life may be a late and elaborate construct.

企画: 慶應義塾大学 GCOE 「論理と感性の先端的教育研究拠点形成」脳と進化班 宮田裕光 (学振 PD)

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